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ROPER V. SIMMONS AND OUR CONSTITUTION
IN INTERNATIONAL EQUIPOISE
Roger P. Alford
In Roper v. Simmons, the Court unequivocally affirms the use of
comparative constitutionalism to interpret the Eighth Amendment. It does not,
however, provide an obvious theoretical basis to justify the practice. This Article
searches for a theory to explain the comparativism in Roper using the theories
advanced in the author's previous scholarship. It concludes that of the colorable
candidates, natural law constitutionalism is the most plausible explanation, with
the attendant problems associated therewith. The Article concludes with an
analysis of the possible ramifications of the Court's comparative approach,
suggesting that it may be pursuing a Constitution that is in international
equipoise, with international values distributed liberally throughout our
jurisprudence to ensure foreign and domestic equilibrium.
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INTRODUCTION
Earlier this year in the pages of this journal, I searched for a theory to
justify constitutional comparativism.1 Recognizing that this methodology is
gaining currency, the Article contended that the use of comparative and
international material must be deemed appropriate or inappropriate based
on whether it comports with a particular judge's interpretive mode of
* Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law, Malibu, California.
B.A., Baylor University, 1985; M. Div., Southern Seminary, 1988; J.D., New York University,
1991; L.L.M., University of Edinburgh, 1992. Jennifer Black and Audrey Maness are gratefully
acknowledged for their assistance in preparing this Article.
1. Roger P. Alford, In Search of a Theory for Constitutional Comparativism, 52 UCLA L.
REV. 639 (2005).
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constitutional analysis. It presented four classic constitutional theories-
originalism, natural law, majoritarianism, and pragmatism-and addressed
the question of the propriety of constitutional comparativism under each theory.
As outlined in that Article, each classic theory presents unique
problems for constitutional comparativism. Originalism will not
embrace contemporary comparativism because it does not advance the
fundamental objective of interpreting constitutional text based on the
framers' moral perceptions. A natural law theory of constitutionalism
might justify appeals to foreign experiences to establish universality or
fundamentality, but apart from the due process construct of "implicit
ordered liberty," this theory is discredited out of fears for judicial hegemony
and substantive indeterminacy. Structural majoritarianism, with its strong
emphasis on judicial deference to the political branches, offers few
opportunities for courts to rely upon foreign experiences. Interpretive
majoritarianism is a better candidate, with its infusion of politics into law
through malleable interpretations of the Constitution that bring the text in
line with the times, but the longstanding tradition of the Court has been to
cabin community standards to values reflected in our own national
experience. Pragmatism is perhaps the leading candidate for
comparativism, and transnational empiricism likely will continue to grow in
importance under this theory. But pragmatic decisions that enhance civil
liberties are rare, and pragmatism is inconsistent with the comparative
currents that espouse a summum bonum.
Because all of the classic constitutional theories outlined above do not
fully capture a thoroughgoing theory for constitutional comparativism, the
Article concluded with an outline of what proponents might advance as an
inchoate comparative constitutional theory. Such a theory, however,
struggles for legitimacy based on established criteria for any constitutional
theory, including promotion of the rule of law, protection of political
democracy, and advancement of a morally defensible set of individual rights.
Which brings us to the Supreme Court's death penalty decision in
Roper v. Simmons.2 The Eighth Amendment's proscription on cruel and
unusual punishment is a particularly useful vehicle to test theories of
constitutional comparativism. In this debate, one finds all the major
theories competing for prominence. With the Eighth Amendment, the
Court at various times invokes original meaning, legislative deference,
community standards, universal norms, and pragmatic empiricism.
Accordingly, the death penalty breathes life into different modalities
2. 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
Roper v. Simmons
of constitutional comparativism, and the true mettle of the movement
thus is tested.
The Supreme Court's decision in Roper thus offers a prism to view
constitutional comparativism afresh. The Court in many respects plows no
new ground in embracing evolving standards of decency and defining those
standards based on the majoritarian paradigm of a national consensus. But
unlike any previous Eighth Amendment decision in history, it devotes a
substantial part of the decision to a rigorous defense of constitutional
comparativism. While the plot in Roper is the death of a callous
adolescent, the subplot is the birth of a new comparative jurisprudence.
The Court is not simply deciding a case; it also is defining and
defending a movement: a movement that has the potential to change the
course of constitutional law.'
Part I of this Article outlines the Supreme Court's decision in Roper,
with particular emphasis on its references to comparative experiences. Part
II examines Roper in light of classic constitutional theories that might justify
recourse to constitutional comparativism. It concludes that originalism,
pragmatism, and majoritarianism offer little support for the Court's
comparativism, and that appeals to natural law are the best explanation for
the Court's comparative references. Part III concludes with an exploration
of the Court's extravagant salute to constitutional comparativism in Roper's
conclusion, and it posits that such language may introduce a constitutional
theory of international equipoise. Such a theory is the logical conclusion of
a constitutional approach that seeks confirmation abroad for rights we deem
central at home. Under such an approach, an effort to place our
jurisprudence in its international context underscores the degree to which
the Roper paradigm might open for reconsideration constitutional rights
based on their disequilibrium with international values.
3. See infra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
4. See Paolo G. Carozza, "My Friend Is a Stranger": The Death Penalty and the Global lus
Commune of Human Rights, 81 TEX L. REV. 1031, 1033 (2003) ("[Tlhe U.S. Supreme Court is on
the threshold of participating more fully in a substantial transnational normative community that
could, in principle, have a significant impact on U.S. law."); Charles Fried, Scholars and Judges:
Reason and Power, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 807, 819 (2000) (discussing expansion of the tradi-
tional "canon of authoritative materials from which constitutional common law reasoning might
go forward"); Diarmund E. O'Scannlain, What Role Should Foreign Practice and Precedent Play in the
Interpretation of Domestic Law?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1893, 1909 (2005) (stating that judges
who disregard differences in legal systems run the risk of "profoundly altering their legal system by
incorporating incompatible foreign values"); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of
Courts, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 191, 203 (2003) (discussing potential change to the course of American
law resulting from constitutional cross-fertilization).
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I. ROPER V. SIMMONS
The Supreme Court began its decision in Roper by emphatically
reaffirming the use of "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress
of a maturing society"5 to determine which punishments are cruel and
unusual under the Eighth Amendment. It began its cursory review of its
death penalty jurisprudence with the 1988 plurality decision in Thompson v.
Oklahoma,6 noting that the Thompson plurality recognized that executing
juveniles less than sixteen years old would "offend civilized standards of
decency," a conclusion "consistent with the views that have been expressed
by respected professional organizations, by other nations that share our
Anglo-American heritage, and by the leading members of the Western
European community."7
The Court then summarized the 1989 "baseline" decisions of Stanford
v. Kentucky' and Penry v. Lynaugh.9 In Stanford, the Court failed to find a
national consensus that executing juveniles was cruel and unusual.10 The
Court also noted that a plurality in Stanford (actually a five-justice
majority)1 quite "emphatically reject[ed] the suggestion that the Court
should bring its own judgment to bear on the acceptability of the juvenile
death penalty."'2 On the same day Stanford was decided, Penry v. Lynaugh
was also decided and likewise held that a national consensus did not exist to
ban execution of the mentally retarded." These decisions in 1989 thus became
the benchmark for subsequent reconsideration of the emergence of an
evolving standard for executing both classes of persons.
5. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1190 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (plural-
ity opinion)).
6. 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (plurality opinion).
7. Id. at 830.
8. 492 U.S. 361 (1989), overruled by Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
9. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
10. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1191 (citing Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370-71).
11. The Court in Stanford rejected reliance on its own conceptions of decency in both the
five-justice majority and the four-justice plurality portions of the opinion:
In determining what standards have "evolved," however, we have looked not to our own
conceptions of decency, but to those of modern American society as a whole. As we
have said, "Eighth Amendment judgments should not be, or appear to be, merely the
subjective views of individual Justices; judgment should be informed by objective factors
to the maximum possible extent."
Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)).
12. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1191 (citing Stanford, 492 U.S. at 377-78 (alteration in original)).
Justice O'Connor refused to join the final sections of Stanford for reasons independent from those cited
by the Court in Roper. See id. at 382 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
13. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1191 (citing Penry, 492 U.S. at 334).
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Thirteen years later, the standards had evolved sufficiently for the Court
to reconsider Penry in Atkins v. Virginia.'4 Atkins "returned to the rule"'5
predating Stanford: "[Tihe Constitution contemplates that in the end our own
judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the
death penalty under the Eighth Amendment."'6 Finding the retribution and
deterrence arguments less defensible for persons with mental impairments,
and recognizing the existence of a national consensus against executing the
mentally retarded, the Court in Atkins ruled that the death penalty for such
persons offends the Eighth Amendment." In a footnote, the Court
recognized that its conclusions were consistent with those of the "world
community.' 8  Atkins thus set the stage for reconsideration of the death
penalty as applied to juveniles.
Most significant in Roper was the methodology emphasized in
determining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual. The Court found:
The beginning point is a review of objective indicia of consensus, as
expressed in particular by the enactments of legislatures that have
addressed the question. This data gives us essential instruction. We
then must determine, in the exercise of our own independent
judgment, whether the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment
for juveniles.'9
This approach highlights the subjective, independent appraisal of the Court
in defining what human dignity requires, with objective indicia simply
factors for consideration in that analysis. Objective inputs are factors that
inform subjective outputs.
Turning to the national consensus, the Court focused on the number
of states that had abandoned the death penalty altogether, combined with
those that maintained it but excluded juveniles from its reach. By the
Court's calculation, thirty states prohibit the juvenile death penalty, with
twelve rejecting the death penalty outright and an additional eighteen
14. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
15. Id.
16. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1191-92 (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312).
17. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318-21.
18. Id. at 317 n.21. The Court further noted:
Additional evidence makes it clear that this legislative judgment reflects a much broader
social and professional consensus.... [Wlithin the world community, the imposition of
the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly
disapproved.... Although these factors are by no means dispositive, their consistency
with the legislative evidence lends further support to our conclusion that there is a con-
sensus among those who have addressed the issue.
Id. at 316-17 n.21.
19. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1192.
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prohibiting it only for juveniles. These raw numbers were deemed "similar"
and "parallel" to the numbers in Atkins." The most significant objective
difference between the two cases was in the pace of change. As Justice
O'Connor noted in dissent, "[T]he extraordinary wave of legislative action
leading up to our decision in Atkins provided strong evidence that the
country truly had set itself against capital punishment of the mentally
retarded. Here, by contrast, the halting pace of change gives reason for
pause."'" The Court found this difference insignificant, in part because it
now deemed direction, rather than pace, as most significant. Also significant
was the fact that many states already prohibited the death penalty prior to
when Stanford was decided, thereby precluding the possibility of a steep
legislative trend."
The Court also diminished the importance of a federal consensus on
avoiding preemption of state juvenile death penalty laws, discounting the
Senate's reservation of a clause prohibiting the juvenile death penalty when
ratifying the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) in 1992. It did so because the federal government had not
affirmatively imposed the juvenile death penalty in enacting the Federal
Death Penalty Act and because a handful of states had abandoned the
practice since the reservation was signed.23 Thus, the Court discounted a
consensus on allowing the juvenile death penalty at the state level because
there was no consensus to impose it at the federal level.
The Court was at pains in Roper to find a national consensus against
the juvenile death penalty, but did not clearly conclude that one existed.
The Court indicated there was no national consensus in favor of capital
punishment for juveniles, but that consensus existed that juveniles are
"categorically less culpable than the average criminal."24  The former
conclusion shifts the burden to death penalty proponents, as though a
practice is presumed unusual unless proven otherwise. The latter
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1211 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 1193 (majority opinion).
23. The Court focused on the congressional decision not to extend the federal death penalty
to juveniles, rather than the Senate's reservation to retain each state's prerogative to do so.
[The Senate treaty] reservation at best provides only faint support for petitioner's argu-
ment. First, the reservation was passed in 1992; since then, five States have abandoned
capital punishment for juveniles. Second, Congress considered the issue when enacting
the Federal Death Penalty Act in 1994, and determined that the death penalty should
not extend to juveniles. The reservation to Article 6(5) of the ICCPR provides minimal
evidence that there is not now a national consensus against juvenile executions.
Id. at 1194 (citations omitted).
24. Id. (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002)).
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conclusion supplants one consensus for another, as though a common
numerator would suffice for a common denominator. However, a consensus
on diminished fault is not a consensus to diminish punishment. Unlike in
Atkins, the Court never expressly concluded that "[t]he practice... has
become truly unusual, and it is fair to say that a national consensus has
developed against it."25 The most it could say was that "[a] majority of States have
rejected the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile offenders under 18,
and we now hold this is required by the Eighth Amendment."26
The Court's conclusion that this penalty was cruel and unusual was
bolstered by subjective analysis of the diminished culpability of juveniles.
The Court set forth three factors to support its conclusion: juveniles' lack of
maturity, greater susceptibility to peer pressure, and undeveloped and
transitory character.27 "These differences," the Court concluded, "render
suspect any conclusion that a juvenile falls among the worst offenders"28 for
whom the death penalty is reserved. Having found juveniles to be of
diminished culpability, the Court then analyzed the policies that sustain the
death penalty. The Court concluded that the two most common justifications-
retribution and deterrence-applied with lesser force to juveniles. "Retribution is
not proportional if the law's most severe penalty is imposed on one whose
culpability.., is diminished.., by reason of youth and immaturity."" As for
deterrence, "[tihe likelihood that the teenage offender has made the kind of cost-
benefit analysis that attaches any weight to the possibility of execution is so
remote as to be virtually nonexistent. '
The Court then rejected the argument that these general conclusions
with regards to juveniles do not provide a sufficient basis for categorical
prohibitions. Much of petitioner's argument rested on the contention that
a categorical rule was arbitrary and unnecessary in a system already
considering aggravating and mitigating circumstances.3 The Court con-
cluded that the risk was simply too great to trust juries with the task of
discerning which juvenile falls into this special category of sufficient
culpability.32 Bringing its "independent judgment to bear" on the subject, the
Court concluded that "the death penalty cannot be imposed upon juvenile
25. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316.
26. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1194 (emphasis added).
27. Id. at 1194.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1196.
30. Id. (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 837 (1988)).
31. Id. at 1197.
32. Id.
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offenders,"33 reasoning that "when a juvenile offender commits a heinous
crime, the State can exact forfeiture of some of the most basic liberties, but
the State cannot extinguish his life and his potential to attain a mature
understanding of his own humanity."34
The Court could have concluded its decision without further
discussion. Had it done so, Roper would have been consistent with a line of
Eighth Amendment cases that offer mere passing references to comparative
practice." But for the first time in history, the Supreme Court devoted an
entire section of an Eighth Amendment opinion-six paragraphs and just
under four pages of the slip opinion-to constitutional comparativism.
Something new clearly was afoot.
The Court began its reference to constitutional comparativism by
noting that its own determination "finds confirmation in the stark reality that
the United States is the only country in the world that continues to give
official sanction to the juvenile death penalty."36  This fact, the Court
emphasized, was not "controlling," but it was "instructive" for its
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. As the Court put it, "The opinion
of the world community, while not controlling our outcome, does provide
respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions."3 The indicia
of constitutional comparativism the Court relied upon were international
treaties, near uniform state practice, and the United Kingdom's twentieth-
century experience.38 In summarizing the comparative analysis, the Court
concluded that "it is fair to say that the United States now stands alone in a
world that has turned its face against the juvenile death penalty."39
33. Id. at 1198.
34. Id. at 1197.
35. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S.
261, 369 n.1 (1989); Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830; Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796-97 n.22
(1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)
(plurality opinion); see also Diane Marie Amann, "Raise the Flag and Let It Talk": On the Use of
External Norms in Constitutional Decision Making, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L. 597, 605 (2004) ("Foreign law
has tended to appear as an expendable after-thought, a gratuitous remark on alien practice.").
36. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1198.
37. Id. at 1200.
38. Id. at 1199-200. The Court noted that, at least since Trop, it has referred to the laws
of other countries and to international authorities as instructive for its interpretation of the
Eighth Amendment. Id. at 1198. It then noted that the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
which every country in the world has ratified save for the United States and Somalia, "contains an
express prohibition on capital punishment for. . . juveniles under 18." Id. at 1199. It also noted
"parallel prohibitional" contained in other significant international covenants, including the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Id. As for state practice, it
concluded that only seven countries have executed juveniles since 1990 and that the United Kingdom,
in particular, abolished the juvenile death penalty in 1948. Id. at 1199-200.
39. Id. at 1199.
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Finally, the Court concluded with a statement that forcefully justified the
practice of constitutional comparativism. Few, if any, statements in
constitutional history have asserted as strongly the legitimacy of this approach:
Over time, from one generation to the next, the Constitution has
come to earn the high respect and even ... the veneration of the
American people. The document sets forth, and rests upon,
innovative principles original to the American experience, such as
federalism;... separation of powers; specific guarantees for the accused
in criminal cases; and broad provisions to secure individual freedom
and preserve human dignity. These doctrines and guarantees are
central to the American experience and remain essential to our
present-day self-definition and national identity. Not the least of the
reasons we honor the Constitution, then, is because we know it to be
our own. It does not lessen our fidelity to the Constitution or our pride in
its origins to acknowledge that the express affirmation of certain
fundamental rights by other nations and peoples simply underscores the
centrality of those same rights within our own heritage of freedom.40
I. IN SEARCH OF A THEORY IN ROPER
Roper is the latest of many decisions in which the Court has referenced
comparative experiences to interpret constitutional guarantees without
articulating a theoretical basis to justify the reference. This pregnant
negative beckons one to identify the theory that gives birth to the Court's
comparativism. A brief review of theoretical candidates suggests a number of
plausible justifications.
A. Originalism
In Roper there are no grand allusions to the Magna Carta or other
historical invocations of our deeply rooted Anglo-American traditions."
One might say that with Roper we do not have a Constitution of our
Founding Fathers, but rather a Constitution of our Modish Brothers.
A jurisprudence that embraces evolving standards of decency has little
occasion to invoke originalism to discern whether a prohibition is cruel and
unusual. The Court in Roper was no exception, categorically rejecting the
appropriateness of originalism by affirming the "necessity" of "evolving
40. Id. at 1200 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
41. Compare Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion), with Harmelin v.
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 973-74 (1991).
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standards of decency."42  Justice O'Connor was most explicit in dissent,
opining that it is "now beyond serious dispute that the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition ... is not a static command. Its mandate would be little more
than a dead letter today if it barred only those sanctions.., that civilized
society had already repudiated in 1791."'
But if traditional originalism was rejected, there were two references in
the opinion that faintly adverted to aspirational originalism. First, the
Court gave special emphasis to genealogical comparativism in relying on
Britain's evolving experience with the death penalty. The Court
emphasized that "[t]he United Kingdom's experience bears particular
relevance here in light of the historic ties between our countries and in
light of the Eighth Amendment's own origins."'" The suggestion is not a novel
one, for Anglo-American traditions are a common reference point in
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence." But what is novel is to suggest that the
evolving, contemporary practices of Britain deserve special consideration
because of our common heritage. Comparative reference to Britain is
encouraged, not to understand our common roots,46 but to follow her lead in
rejecting them. This version of originalism suggests that our shared
foundation includes a shared understanding that constitutional principles
must evolve.
Echoing this theme is the less subtle appeal to originalism offered by
Justice Stevens's brief concurrence. In defending the long heritage of an
evolving Constitution, Justice Stevens remarked:
That our understanding of the Constitution does change from time
to time has been settled since John Marshall breathed life into its
text. If great lawyers of his day-Alexander Hamilton, for
example-were sitting with us today, I would expect them to join
Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court.47
42. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1190 (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 100-01).
43. Id. at 1206-07 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1205 (Stevens, J., concurring)
("If the meaning of that Amendment had been frozen when it was originally drafted, it would
impose no impediment to the execution of 7-year-old children today.").
44. Id. at 1199 (majority opinion).
45. Alford, supra note 1, at 688-90.
46. See, e.g., Seth Barrett Tillman, A Textualist Defense of Article I, Section 7,
Clause 3: Why Hollingsworth v. Virginia Was Rightly Decided and Why INS v. Chadha Was
Wrongly Reasoned, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1265, 1323-24 (2005) (discussing comparative analysis
to understand original meaning).
47. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1205 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Far from turning in their graves," Justice Stevens suggests that the enrobed
ghosts of our Founding Fathers would heartily concur with the divinations
of the Court's current occupants. This is a rather blatant appeal to
originalism in the Dworkinian theory, that the Framers intended to enact
general principles that would evolve with the times and the present-day
Court is respecting those originalist intentions.4 9 Under this originalist
view, the Framers required what posterity desired.
Such originalism, of course, is counter to traditional understandings of the
term. Although these justices may attempt to pour new wine into old
wineskins, most who read Roper readily would concur with Justice Scalia in that
the "Court has... long rejected a purely originalist approach to our Eighth
Amendment, and that is certainly not the approach the Court takes today."50
B. Pragmatism
For a pragmatist, experience, not logic, is the life of the law. 51
That experience "embraces the totality of the cultural encounters that
an objective and fair-minded judge brings to the decisionmaking
process."52  With increasing frequency, certain pragmatic judges will
48. Needless to say, Justice Scalia's understanding of what Alexander Hamilton would
require is quite different. See id. at 1217 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Hamilton's views on capital pun-
ishment undoubtedly were less sanguine than Justice Stevens suggests. During the American
Revolution, Hamilton was a Lieutenant Colonel and aide-de-camp serving directly under George
Washington, who would discipline deserting young soldiers under pain of death. See RON
CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 151 (2004); JOSEPH J. ELLIS, His EXCELLENCY: GEORGE
WASHINGTON 27, 80 (2004). When Washington's personal guard, Thomas Hickey, was executed
in 1776 for plotting to murder Washington, Hamilton applauded Washington's "swift justice" and
stated that he "hoped the remainder of those miscreants now in our possession will meet with a
punishment adequate to their crimes." CHERNOW, supra, at 75-76. In the Benedict Arnold affair
of 1780, Hamilton and Washington had bitter disagreements over whether Arnold's British con-
tact, Major John Andre, should hang as a common criminal or be shot as a gentleman, with
Hamilton fully recognizing that Andre's execution was an indispensable act of riod justice. Id. at
143-44; ELLIS, supra, at 129. And of course, Hamilton viewed death by dueling as an appropriate
remedy for political insult. For Hamilton, dueling was a "custom which has ... received the sanc-
tion of public opinion in the refined age and nation in which we live, by which it is made the test
of honor or disgrace." Id. at 685. Both Hamilton and his nineteen-year-old son, Philip, were mor-
tally wounded in duels. Following his son's death by dueling, he commented that whatever voices
of public opinion may be raised against the custom, outlawing the practice is a matter for "legisla-
tive interference." Id. at 655.
49. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 7-9 (1996).
50. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1228 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
51. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Little, Brown & Co., 42d prtg.
1948) (1881).
52. Alford, supra note 1, at 693.
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allow foreign experiences to inform their understanding of possible
constitutional solutions to common contemporary problems. 3
But the comparativism of Roper offers scant support for a pragmatic
theoretical justification. As discussed below, Roper concerns itself with the
"precept of justice" that grants citizens the right against excessive
sanction. 4 It invokes the discernment of what human dignity requires as
the basis for the Eighth Amendment prohibition.5" And finally, it relies
upon majoritarian impulses at home and abroad as objective indicators of
contemporary standards of cruelty.56
If there is a strain of pragmatism in Roper, it is with reference to the
"empirical" analysis of juveniles' diminished culpability. The Court
suggests that psychology confirms what any parent knows: that juveniles are
less mature, more prone to peer pressure, and yet to develop their fixed
character.57 From this, the Court draws the syllogism that juveniles are less
culpable, and therefore not among the worst offenders.5" Thus, they cannot
be subject to the severest penalties.59
As for recourse to comparativism, although the Court offers other
justifications elsewhere, it does suggest that "[i]t is proper that we acknowl-
edge the overwhelming weight of international opinion against the juvenile
death penalty, resting in large part on the understanding that the instability
and emotional imbalance of young people may often be a factor in the
crime."'  In other words, foreign countries' experience with emotionally
unstable youth and violent crime is consistent with our own experience.
To this extent at least, one might say that the Court's appeal to
comparativism is justified by pragmatic understandings that we all recognize
the root psychological causes that factor into the violent tendencies of
troubled teens-and that we, like they, must be more accommodating in
meting out punishment.
53. Id. at 696-97.
54. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1190 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002) (quoting
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,367 (1910))).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1192-94, 1198-200.
57. Id. at 1195.
58. Id. at 1195-96.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1200. It is worth noting that the Preamble to the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, although primarily addressing grand themes of inherent dignity and inalienable rights, also
justifies the protections embodied therein as premised on a shared recognition that "the child, by
reason of his physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care." See Convention on the
Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, at pmbl., U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., 61st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/44/25 (Nov. 20, 1989), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/44/a44rO25.htm.
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The problem, of course, is that we do not all recognize these root
psychological causes as a factor for all juvenile crime. The science of
human development is hardly capable of claiming inescapable empirical
conclusions. For example, there is debate as to whether innate stages of
human development even exist. The "epigenetic principle"6 developed by
Freud's disciple, Erik Erikson, whom the Court expressly relied upon,62 is highly
controversial, and many psychologists espouse developmental theories that
emphasize incremental phases rather than predetermined stages.63 Even
assuming that stages do exist, the American Psychological Association
concedes the inexact line between them when it demarcates adolescence as
the seven-to-nine year period "beginning at age 10 or 11 and continuing
until age 18 or 19." 64 Moreover, virtually any introductory college textbook
on human development will divide the human experience into periods, but
underscore that the normal range of behavior includes a wide spectrum of
individual differences. As Justice O'Connor put it, "Adolescents as a class
are undoubtedly less mature .... But [there is] no evidence impeaching
the... conclusion.., that at least some 17 year-old murderers are
sufficiently mature to deserve the death penalty in an appropriate case.,
65
Consistent with this debate, twenty state legislatures-representing
over one-third of the U.S. population-have reached the conclusion that
immaturity is a highly probable, but not ineluctable, personality trait in
juveniles. Therefore, diminished culpability should be a mitigating factor
considered on a case-by-case basis. Majorities in these states believe that,
in rare instances, some older juveniles are mature enough to fall within the
category of worst offenders who deserve the harshest of punishments. For
61. The epigenetic principle states:
[Alnything that grows has a ground plan, and that out of this ground plan the parts arise,
each part having its time of special ascendancy, until all parts have arisen to form a func-
tioning whole.... Personality, therefore, can be said to develop according to steps predetermined
in the human organism's readiness.., to interact with a widening radius of significant
individuals and institutions.
ERIK ERIKSON, IDENTITY YOUTH AND CRISIS 92-93 (1968).
62. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1195.
63. The amicus brief of the American Psychological Association avoided this debate by
consistently referring to the general tendencies of adolescents as a group, recognizing that there
will be individualized deviations from the norm. It conceded that "individualized capital sentencing
does allow the presentation of mitigating evidence, including that related to youth, which, of
course, may be relevant in certain cases of young adults as well" but discounted the reliability of
such sentencing based on the methodology employed. Brief for the American Psychological
Association, and the Missouri Psychological Association as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent
4-16, Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005) (No. 03-633).
64. Id. at 4.
65. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1206 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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these twenty states at least, the Court has invoked countermajoritarian
comparativism to deny their citizens the distinctive choices they have made
regarding root causes and just punishment.
C. Majoritarianism
As discussed in my previous article, at least since Coker the principal
approach in death penalty jurisprudence has been one of synthesizing
structural and interpretive majoritarianism. 66 Structural majoritarianism
limits the role of constitutional review by recognizing that any declaration
of unconstitutionality thwarts majoritarian preferences reflected in legislative
and executive pronouncements. Interpretative majoritarianism "concerns
the infusion of politics into law through malleable interpretations of the
Constitution that bring the text in line with the times., 6' Applied to the
Eighth Amendment, the Court accepts the notion that the Constitution
should be read in light of evolving standards of decency but then cabins
that broad notion within the majoritarian paradigm of the national
consensus. Such synthetic majoritarianism permits the Court to adopt an
evolving standard of decency, while remaining somewhat deferential to the
majoritarian decisions of state legislatures.'
In many respects, Roper repeats this theme with its reliance on the
national consensus as instructive of whether the punishment is cruel and
unusual. The Court says that the Constitution must evolve, but that its
evolution must reflect the majoritarian views of the state legislatures. 69 But
there are three great weaknesses of Roper's majoritarian paradigm. First,
under the baseline established in Stanford, one presumably would need to show
some significant movement to establish a new national consensus. Yet
there was no such significant movement in the time between Stanford and
Roper."0 Second, the federal government expressly reserved the right of the
states to continue the practice of the juvenile death penalty when the
Senate ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in
1992."1 This reflects a federal consensus that the propriety of this practice
66. Alford, supra note 1, at 689-92.
67. Id. at 674.
68. Id. at 688-92.
69. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1192-94.
70. As Justice O'Connor noted, the pace of change in Atkins was significantly greater than
in Roper. Only four states have reversed course since Stanford, while sixteen had done so since
Penry. Id. at 1211 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
71. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 6, opened for signature Dec.
16, 1966, S. EXEC. DOc. E, 95-2, at 23, 25 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 173 (entered into force
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should be left to state legislatures. If over two-thirds of the Senate
voted to retain state power to execute juveniles, and over one-third of
the states exercise this prerogative, it is exceedingly difficult to argue
that a national consensus against the practice exists. Third, the limited
number of states that actually have executed juveniles since Stanford was used
by the Court to suggest a consensus against the practice. 2 However, this
evidence could just as easily establish that states are judiciously
reserving this punishment for only the worst subset of juvenile
offenders. That is, the evidence may show only a national consensus
that juveniles as a whole are less mature, and that states recognize that
the juvenile death penalty should be used sparingly and for only the most
extreme deviations from the norm.
Does majoritarianism explain the constitutional comparativism in
Roper? As with past Eighth Amendment cases, it is quite clear that Roper
does not justify recourse to comparativism out of a broad conception of
community standards. The Court referenced the national consensus as
instructive to the Court's ultimate judgment on the propriety of the
punishment,73 and thus held that the juvenile death penalty was cruel and
unusual punishment. 4 Only then did it confirm the correctness of its
conclusion by reference to international experience."' Roper does not
change the conclusion that "the global consensus does not provide content
to the national consensus and the global consensus is of no relevance in the
absence of a national consensus." 6  The Court emphasized that it was
relying on comparative experiences only to confirm what it already had
decided was required. "The opinion of the world community, while not
controlling our outcome, does provide respected and significant
confirmation for our own conclusions." Justice O'Connor's dissent is even
more explicit in this regard, finding it wholly inappropriate to seek
international confirmation of a national consensus that in her view does
Mar. 23, 1976) (ratified by the United States on June 8, 1992); U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice
and Consent to Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
138 CONG. REC. 4781, 4781-84 (Apr. 2,1992).
72. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1192.
73. Id. at 1192-94.
74. Id. at 1192-98.
75. Id. at 1198-200.
76. Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret the Constitution, 98 AM. J. INT'L
L. 57, 60 (2004) (footnote omitted).
77. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1200.
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not exist. 8  Roper, therefore, lends no support for the conclusion that
community standards should be based on a real or imagined global village.
But what Roper does clarify is that, from the Court's perspective,
comparative reference is anything but superfluous.79 When the objective
indicators of a national consensus are weak, the strong global consensus fortifies
the Court's independent judgment. It emboldens the Court to do what is
"right"-weak domestic indicators be damned. One might say that the Court
recognizes that exotic suspenders take on increasing importance when one's
trusty belt is threadbare. Indeed, so weak are the domestic indicators and so
strong are the global indicators that one wonders whether majoritarianism fully
captures the theoretical justification for the Court's decision in Roper. It appears
that in Roper the Court has begun to elevate the importance of natural law to a
status above majoritarianism, and has resorted to foreign practice as one
benchmark for the correctness of its conception of what human dignity requires.
D. Natural Law
Much of Roper echoes natural law themes. The Court emphasized that
the Eighth Amendment flows from basic precepts of justice that
fundamentally affirm respect for human dignity.80  It finds in the
Constitution a restriction on the State's ability to extinguish a juvenile's
life, thereby granting him the "potential to attain a mature understanding
of his own humanity."'" Most significant, it emphasized that evolving
standards of decency of a maturing society are the constitutional test, and
that objective indicators of that standard are simply inputs that the Court
must factor into its ultimate analysis. But in the end, the Court's own
moral judgment of what the Constitution requires is dispositive."2
The Court's references to comparative experiences are best understood as
objective signposts in the Court's search for constitutional limits grounded in
78. Justice O'Connor would refrain from a comparative analysis of evolving standards of
decency in the absence of a national consensus of the question:
[Biecause I do not believe that a genuine national consensus against the juvenile death
penalty has yet developed, and because I do not believe the Court's moral proportional-
ity argument justifies a categorical, age-based constitutional rule, I can assign no such
confirmatory role to the international consensus described by the Court.
Id. at 1215 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
79. Alford, supra note 1, at 709 ("To the extent that international norms reflect
contemporary majoritarian preferences within the national experience, the added value of their
consistency with international norms is limited.").
80. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1190.
81. Id. at 1197.
82. Id. at 1192; id. at 1206 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 1217 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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natural law. First, the Court starts with a philosophical construct it
denominates "human dignity." This, it concludes, is what the Constitution
must uphold. It then reasons that its own understanding of that concept is
dispositive. All citizens must abide by the Court's own understanding of
constitutional anthropology. But recognizing that such subjective
conclusions are fraught with institutional and normative risks, it recoils from
free-floating constitutionalism by seeking instruction from objective indicators.
The objective indicators it chooses are those most likely to coincide with its
own collective intuition, which is the evolving standard of decency reflected in
the contemporary national consensus and confirmed by enlightened global
affirmations. Competing objective indicia, such as text, history, tradition,
precedent, or even Judeo-Christian principles, are all but ignored. The dictates
of contemporary moral sense designate the practice as disreputable, and the
truth of this sentiment is evinced by the fact that it has gone into general
disuse." Comparativism thus provides a particular moral valence to the Court's
independent judgment of what our Constitution requires.
But of course, the great risk of this approach is judicial hegemony and
substantive indeterminacy.' If the Constitution simply imposes moral
abstractions, such as "human dignity" that the Court is to divine by
searching its inner conscience, then "judges of the law" truly do risk
becoming a "committee of philosopher-kings.""5 Indeed, in Roper, Justice
Scalia's strongest vitriol is reserved for the Court's "usurpation of the role of
moral arbiter" by which "nine lawyers presume to be the authoritative
conscience of the Nation." 6 A natural law decision such as Roper may have
strong moral and legal legitimacy, but it is suspect in terms of its sociological
legitimacy, which depends on the public perception that the Court is adhering
to principled legal norms.s7
83. To paraphrase an historical natural law decision. See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
199, 255 (1790) (Paterson, J., concurring).
84. Alford, supra note 1 at 668.
85. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 379 (1989); see also Michel Rosenfeld, Constitutional
Adjudication in Europe and the United States: Paradoxes and Contrasts, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L. 633, 665
(2004) (conceding that the Constitution does not explicitly address many contentious social issues,
contributing to the "erosion of the legitimacy of constitutional interpretation" and forcing the
constitutional adjudicator to take sides on social issues and undermine societal harmony).
86. Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1221-22 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
87. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1794-
1802, 1841 (2005) (stating that legal legitimacy recognizes that a ruling is to be followed as the law;
moral legitimacy asks whether a decision is morally justifiable; and sociological legitimacy considers
whether the public regards a decision as justified and worthy of support for reasons other than fear of
sanction or hope of reward).
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The Court historically recognized the strength of this criticism, and
whenever it has displayed natural law leanings it has recognized the
potential for judicial overreaching." As such, it has sought to rein in this
subjective risk with objective limitations. In the substantive due process
context, Justice Harlan emphasized that "judicial 'self-restraint' is an indispensa-
ble ingredient of sound constitutional adjudication" and that it is achieved
"by continual insistence upon respect for the teachings of history, solid
recognition of the basic values that underlie our society, and wise
appreciation of the great roles that the doctrines of federalism and
separation of powers have played in establishing and preserving American
freedoms." 9  These objective checks are manifested in the Washington v.
Glucksberg' test for substantive due process, which limits fundamental
rights to those that are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"'" and
"deeply rooted in [our] history and tradition."92
The Eighth Amendment displays similar concerns for objective ballast,
with the national consensus serving as the paradigm for contemporary
understandings of human decency. In the past, the Court has suggested that
foreign practice might be useful as an additional indicator of what ordered
societies require, but rarely has it given any real credence to foreign practices. 93
Roper is significant in that it elevates foreign practice to a confirmatory role of
what human decency requires. 94 If Glucksberg defines the objective limitations
on substantive due process, Roper defines the objective limitations on cruel and
unusual punishment. It prohibits excessive sanctions based on the "objective
indicia of [a national] consensus" confirmed by "fundamental rights" affirmed
by "other nations."95 Both of these are objective benchmarks instructive to
the Court's ultimate conclusions of what the Constitution requires.96
88. Alford, supra note 1, at 667-69.
89. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
90. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
91. Id. at 721 (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,325 (1937)).
92. Id. (citing Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,503 (1977) (plurality opinion)).
93. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361,369 n.1 (1989).
94. Thus far, the Court has not gone so far as some have suggested and used an overwhelm-
ing international consensus as the basis to refrain from following the considered judgment reached
by our citizenry and its legislators. See SARAH H. CLEVELAND, OUR INTERNATIONAL CONSTITUTION
(forthcoming 2005) (suggesting overwhelming international consensus could provide reason to
disagree with national consensus); Harold Hongju Koh, Paying "Decent Respect" to World Opinion
on the Death Penalty, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1085, 1129 (2002) ("The evidence strongly suggests
that we do not currently pay decent respect to the opinions of humankind in our administration of
the death penalty. For that reason, the death penalty should, in time, be declared in violation of
the Eighth Amendment.") (emphasis added).
95. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1192, 1200 (2003).
96. Id. at 1192,1198-200.
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The difference of course is that Glucksberg looks backward and inward,
while Roper looks forward and outward.9" Both have clear visions of how
the world should be ordered, but what guides one could not be more
different than what guides the other. For Glucksberg, what is natural is
immutable; for Roper, what is in desuetude is unnatural. Roper adheres to a
variation of moral relativism that denies the immutability of truth and finds
a constitutional right of generational sovereignty, echoing Lawrence v.
Texas's9 conception that "times can blind us to certain truths and later
generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact
serve only to oppress."99 Roper's benchmark for natural law is the shifting current
of the enlightened present, not the abiding wisdom of the blinkered past.
What gives one pause about Roper is that it is unclear whether the
objective indicators proffered impose any significant limitations on the Court.
Objectivism is invoked, but it has no purchase. To borrow Justice Harlan's
97. The difference in terms of democratic legitimacy cannot be ignored. As Kenneth
Anderson has noted:
The Constitution derives its legitimacy from the people who are governed thereby and
not because it is the enactment of some body of universal law .... If that interpretation
be so-and it seems to be the ordinary understanding of Americans, including their
elites-then the invocation of foreign constitutional law, no matter how persuasive its
content, is fundamentally at odds with democratic constitutional self-government.
Kenneth Anderson, Squaring the Circle? Reconciling Sovereignty and Global Governance Through
Global Government Networks, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1309 (2005); see also Jed Rubenfeld, The
Two World Orders, WILSON Q., Autumn 2003, at 22, 29 (arguing that American constitutional
rights claim authority not from universal rights but from democratic authority); Jed Rubenfeld,
Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 1997-99 (2004) (distinguishing
between European "international constitutionalism" based on universal rights and American
"democratic constitutionalism" based on democratic self-governance).
98. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
99. Id. at 579. In this regard, Roper follows Justice Brennan's earlier view of generational
sovereignty. justice Brennan stated:
We current Justices read the Constitution in the only way that we can: as Twentieth
Century Americans. We look to the history of the time of framing and to the interven-
ing history of interpretation. But the ultimate question must be, what do the words of
the text mean in our time. For the genius of the Constitution rests not in any static
meaning it might have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its
great principles to cope with current problems and needs. What the constitutional fun-
damentals meant to the wisdom of other times cannot be their measure to the vision of our
time. Similarly, what those fundamentals mean for us, our descendants will learn,
cannot be the measure to the vision of their time.
Speech of Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. to the Text and Teaching Symposium, at Georgetown
University (Oct. 12, 1985), reprinted in THE GREAT DEBATE: INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN
CONSTITUTION 17 (The Federalist Soc'y 1986); see also DWORKIN, supra note 49, at 82 (The
Constitution commands that "our judges do their best... to construct, reinspect, and revise, gen-
eration by generation, the skeleton of liberal equal concern that the great clauses, in their majestic
abstraction, demand").
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thoughts in Griswold v. Connecticut,'"a there is little evidence that the Court
in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence respects the teachings of history,
recognizes the basic values that underlie our society, or fully appreciates the
role that federalism plays in establishing and preserving American
freedoms.' Failure to appreciate such factors has liberated the Court to
"roam[ ] at large in the constitutional field.""1 2 Instead of applying these
factors, it has relied on the imperfect medium of an ill-defined national
consensus coupled with strong support from abroad based on best practices
that the United States has expressly eschewed. 13 If the Court continues on
its current path, it has all but set the stage for a finding that the death
penalty itself is unconstitutional,1 4 based on halting legislative trends toward
abolition, the infrequency of state practice, and a general consensus abroad ofwhatdignty . 105
what dignity requires. The Court could rely on such objective indicia to
100. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
101. Id. at 501 (Harlan, J., concurring).
102. Id. at 502.
103. For a discussion of the United States as a persistent objector to developing interna-
tional law norms on the juvenile death penalty, see Curtis A. Bradley, The Juvenile Death Penalty
and International Law, 52 DUKE L.J. 485, 516-35 (2002) and Laurence E. Rothenberg, International
Law, U.S. Sovereignty, and the Death Penalty, 35 GEo. J. INT'L L. 564-68 (2004).
104. Justice Blackmun anticipated just this possibility over ten years ago. See Harty A. Blackmun,
The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104 YALE L.J. 39, 49 (1994) ("I am confident, however, that
at some point the court, and the country will come to appreciate that... the imposition of the death
penalty generally... is no more tolerable than other violations of international law.").
105. International precedent has addressed whether the death penalty violates international
norms. See, e.g., Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989); Inter-American
Comm. on Human Rights [Inter-Am. C.H.R.], Recommendation of the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of the Mentally Ill (Apr. 4, 2001), available at
http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2000eng/chap.6e.htm; The Question of the Death Penalty, Comm'n
on Human Rights Res. 2001/68, 9 4 (Apr. 25, 2001), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/
huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/ECN.4.RES.2001.68.EnOpendocument; The Question of the Death Penalty,
Comm'n on Human Rights Res. 2000/65, 913 (Apr. 26, 2000), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/
huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.RES.2000.65.En?Opendocument; The Question of the Death
Penalty, Comm'n on Human Rights Res. 1999/61, 3 (Apr. 28, 1999), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/
huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.RES.1999.61.En?Opendocument; Inter-American Comm.
on Human Rights [Inter-Am. C.H.R.], The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework
of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99 (Oct. 1, 1999), available
at http://www.cidh.org/migrantes/seriea_16_ing.doc; see also State v. Makwanyane & Another,
1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at 412-39 (S. Afr.) (summary of international tribunal decisions
pertaining to death penalty); David Heffernan, Comment, America the Cruel and Unusual? An
Analysis of the Eighth Amendment Under International Law, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 481, 518-39
(1996) (summarizing cases). Moreover, according to Amnesty International, 97 percent of all known
executions in 2004 took place in four countries: China, Iran, Vietnam, and the United States.
The international trend is clearly in the direction of abolition, with fifty countries abolishing the death
penalty since 1985 and only four reintroducing it during that period. Amnesty International, Facts and
Figures on the Death Penalty, http://web.amnesty.org/pages/deathpenalty-facts-eng (last visited
July 4, 2005). "
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make its own independent judgment of what the Constitution requires,
notwithstanding the firm textual, 0 6 historical,"°7 and popular °8 support for
capital punishment.
Although natural law is a useful prism through which to understand
the comparativism in Roper, it may not capture fully the Court's reference
to foreign experiences. The Court may be signaling something more than
simply a test for Eighth Amendment decisionmaking. The final conclusions
in Roper merit close scrutiny, for they may suggest an even more searching
role for comparativism, in which constitutional liberties can be confirmed or
denied based on their affirmation or rejection abroad. In short, the Court may
be introducing a constitutional theory of international equipoise.
1II. INTERNATIONAL EQUIPOISE
The Court, in its concluding embrace of comparativism, boldly
proclaimed that "[it does not lessen our fidelity to the Constitution or our
pride in its origins to acknowledge that the express affirmation of certain
fundamental rights by other nations and peoples simply underscores the
106. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital.., crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury... nor shall any person... be deprived of
life.., without due process of law .. "); id. amend. XIV, § 1 ("IN]or shall any State deprive any
person of life ... without due process of law ... ").
107. John W. Poulos, The Supreme Court, Capital Punishment and the Substantive Criminal
Law: The Rise and Fall of Mandatory Capital Punishment, 28 ARIZ. L. REV. 143, 146-58 (1986).
Even admitting that history cannot serve as a straightjacket to prevent the growth necessary to
allow for the constitutional capacity of adaptation, as Alexander Bickel has noted, one of the
functions of the Court is to use history to maintain continuity in the midst of change.
Change should be a process of growth... [and] should not come about in violent spasms.
Government under law is a continuum, not a series of jerky fresh departures. And so the
past is relevant. Around it cluster settled ways of doing and settled expectations which,
for the sake of both stability and fairness to the individual, should often, as a matter of
principle, control the rate of change in society.
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 107-09 (1962). Writing in the early
1960s, Bickel prophetically asserted that the absence of a "colloquy" on the death penalty sug-
gested that the "moment of judgment" for abolishing the death penalty was "a generation or more
away." Id. at 242.
108. See James H. Wyman, Vengeance Is Whose?: The Death Penalty and Cultural Relativism in
International Law, 6 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 543, 553 (1997) (noting that in the 1990s, 76 percent of
the American public "believe[d] that when one human being kills another, it is appropriate for the
state to execute that human being"). It is the national ethos that perhaps best explains how the Court
could conclude that lesser punishments (such as denationalization or political death) are
unconstitutional, while greater punishments (such as death) are constitutional. See also PHILIP
BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 104 (1982) (noting that
although loss of citizenship is not a fate worse than death, the justification for Trop is the
"American constitutional ethic that representative government ... could not begin slicing off
parts of the Polity without the consent of the people").
53 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1 (2005)
centrality of those same rights within our own heritage of freedom. 1 °9 This
proclamation advances the cause of comparativism in bold and florid strokes,
and one can only faintly imagine the substantive ends these means will bring.
If our fundamental rights are to be confirmed abroad, one wonders
whether comparative confirmation will be used when certain rights central
to our own heritage are not affirmed by other nations, or when fundamental
rights affirmed by other nations are not central to our own system. In short,
one wonders whether this methodology will pursue a constitution in
international equipoise, with international values distributed liberally
throughout our jurisprudence to ensure foreign and domestic equilibrium.
Justice Scalia demanded as much when in dissent he challenged:
The Court should either profess its willingness to reconsider [other
constitutional] matters in light of the views of foreigners, or else... cease
putting forth foreigners' views as part of the reasoned basis of its
decisions. To invoke alien law when it agrees with one's own thinking,
and ignore it otherwise, is not reasoned decisionmaking, but sophistry.
110
Likewise, Justice Ginsburg conceded the strength of this criticism in her
keynote address to the American Society of International Law, when she
advocated reference to foreign decisions as indicators of "common
denominators of basic fairness governing relationships between the governors
and the governed.""' Significantly, when asked whether constitutional
comparativism was appropriate for questions such as abortion, she conceded
that here too we should "look abroad for negative examples.""' 2 This may
signal the advancement or curtailment of liberties in fidelity to the common
denominators of basic fairness in the social compact of governed societies. As
Justice Blackmun put it, the Court's approach should be one that tries to "rec-
oncile the dissonance between domestic and international practice." 1. Our
109. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1200 (2005).
110. Id. at 1228 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
111. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, "A Decent Respect for the Opinions of [Human]kind": The
Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, Address at the American
Society of International Law Annual Meeting (Apr. 1, 2005) (quoting Judge Patricia M. Wald), at
http://www.asil.org/events/AM05/ginsburg05040l.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2005).
112. Id.
113. Blackmun, supra note 104, at 48. Or as one commentator put it, according to this
view, international law would thus become a global "law of lawmaking." Oliver Gerstenberg,
What International Law Should (Not) Become, A Comment on Koskenniemi, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 125,
128 (2005). That is, international law would serve as a rule for the conduct of constitutional
lawmaking, conformity to which may be sufficient to endow the resulting product with a strong
presumptive moral claim to public support. Cf. Frank I. Michelman, A Reply to Baker and Balkin,
39 TULSA L. REV. 649, 650 (2004); Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms Identity: The Role of
Transnational Judicial Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 GEO. L.J. 487, 570
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Constitution could thus become homogenized with others, resulting in
a generic constitutional doctrine."'
What would such an approach demand? A constitution in international
equipoise would recognize that rights affirmed at home are denied abroad and
rights affirmed abroad are denied domestically. That is, if foreign affirmation
of fundamental rights underscores the centrality of rights within our own
heritage, then contrary foreign perspectives may undermine the centrality of
existing constitutional rights, or underline the centrality of those
fundamental rights in other nations that are peripheral within our own.
The beginnings of such an analysis are presented in Table A. This
table plots representative cases based on whether or not they are in
international equipoise. The rows are individual rights that are affirmed,
contested, or denied domestically.' The columns are individual rights that
in general are affirmed, contested, or denied abroad."6
TABLE A
Rights Affirmed Rights Contested Rights Denied
Abroad Abroad Abroad
Rights Affirmed Atkins, Roper, Lawrence, Dale, Roe, Stenberg, Mapp,
Domestically Brown, Harper Miranda Skokie, Sullivan
Rights Contested Knight, Rasul, Harris Ashcroft v. ACLU, U.S. v. Miller,
Domestically Goodridge McConnell
Rights Denied Gregg, Lemon, Lucas, Glucksberg, Reynolds, Whimey, Ferber,
Domestically Burnham, Dandridge Plyler, Nebbia Wainwright
(2005) (stating that international norms are useful not only when they confirm the reasonableness
of domestic norms, but also when they conflict with domestic norms).
114. David S. Law, Generic Constitutional Law, 89 MINN. L. REV. 652, 659 (2005).
115. By rights affirmed or denied domestically, I mean that the courts have opined that a
particular right should or should not be granted constitutional protection. By rights contested
domestically, I mean that the jurisprudence appears to be in flux regarding the status of the par-
ticular right, or in certain cases, such as the Second Amendment right to bear arms, there is a
legal vacuum of reliable authority.
116. By rights affirmed or denied abroad, I mean that based on my research there is a general
practice throughout the world that appears consistently to grant or deny the right. For example,
the overwhelming majority of countries prohibit the death penalty and restrict the right to abortion
on demand. There are dissenting countries, but a general consistency of practice prevails. By
rights contested abroad, I mean that there is no general consistent practice among the over-
whelming majority of nations. For example, there is no general consensus throughout the world
on the right to practice polygamy, with a strong cultural tradition permitting it in African and
Islamic countries, while western countries prohibit it. In certain cases, the right is identified as
contested because it appears to be in a state of flux in many countries, such as the right to practice
homosexual sodomy or physician-assisted suicide.
24 53 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1 (2005)
Plotting the table using landmark cases shows the disequilibrium of our
constitutional jurisprudence. Only the top left cell (cases such as Roper,"7
Atkins,"1 8 Harper,'9 and Brown'20 ) and the bottom right cell (cases such
as Whitney,' Ferber,'22 and Wainwright'23) represent examples in which there
is a high degree of equilibrium, with individual rights affirmed or denied both
at home and abroad. Beyond those two cells there are varying degrees
of disequilibrium. This is most stark in the top right cell, with cases such as
Roe,' Stenberg,'25 Mapp,'26 Skokie,' and New York Times v. Sullivan2s
exemplifying rights that we guarantee at home that in general are denied
abroad, and the lower left cell with cases such as Gregg,29 Lemon,3° Lucas,'
Burnham,' and Dandridge' exemplifying rights that we deny at home that in
general are guaranteed abroad. Beyond these four corners there are (1) cases
such as Lawrence,'34 Dale,"' and Miranda, 36 in which rights are guaranteed at
home but contested abroad; (2) cases such as Glucksberg,'37 Reynolds,'38 Plyler,'39 and
Nebbia,140 in which rights are denied at home but contested abroad; (3) cases
such as Knight,'4' Rasul,'42 and Harris, 4 in which rights are contested at home
but affirmed abroad; (4) cases such as McConnell'" and United States v.
117. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005) (death penalty prohibition for juveniles).
118. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (death penalty prohibition for the mentally retarded).
119. Harper v. Va. Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993) (equal protection and voting).
120. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (equal protection and race).
121. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 (1969) (prohibitions on incitement).
122. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (prohibitions on child pornography).
123. Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21 (1973) (prohibitions on deviant sex).
124. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion).
125. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (partial birth abortion).
126. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusionary rule for unlawfully seized evidence).
127. Nat'l Socialist Party of Am. v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977) (Nazi speech).
128. 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (stringent requirement for defamation of public figures).
129. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (no prohibition on the death penalty).
130. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (rights pertaining to establishment of religion).
131. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (compensation for regulatory takings).
132. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) ("tag" jurisdiction).
133. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (welfare rights).
134. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (privacy and antisodomy laws).
135. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (associational rights to discriminate).
136. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (pre-interrogation rights against self-incrimination).
137. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (physician-assisted suicide).
138. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (polygamy).
139. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (education as fundamental right).
140. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (property rights).
141. Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990 (1999) (prolonged detention on death row).
142. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004) (prolonged detention of enemy combatants).
143. Harris v. Wright, 93 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 1996) (no prohibition on life without parole).
144. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (campaign contributions as protected political speech).
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Miller,'45 in which rights are contested at home but denied abroad; and (5)
cases such as Ashcroft v. ACLU'46 and Goodridge,' 47 in which rights are
contested both at home and abroad.
Plotting constitutional rights based on their international disequilibrium
shows how this new interpretive medium offers something for everyone.
Social conservatives no doubt will be intrigued by an interpretive device that
undermines Roe v. Wade, chips away at the wall of separation between
church and state, and offers only halting support for gay marriage.
Libertarians will welcome an approach that makes greater room for personal
choice on issues such as polygamy, euthanasia, and property rights. Law and
order conservatives will welcome a rethinking of the exclusionary rule, the
need for a Miranda warning, and the freedoms we grant neo-Nazis to spread
their hate. Plaintiffs' lawyers will delight in possible new causes of action for
defamation, while defendants will thrill at a curtailment on tag jurisdiction.
Liberals will embrace the abolition of the death penalty, enhanced
protections for welfare and education rights, greater limits on associational
rights to discriminate, and firm support for gun control.
A constitution in international equipoise has the potential to become
a great political anodyne, offering soothing hope for past constitutional failures.
Virtually every group can benefit from robust constitutional comparativism. But,
of course, it also risks becoming a great political irritant, upsetting settled
expectations of constitutional doctrine. Virtually every group can lose from
constitutional comparativism, although at present its patrons are from the left
as the protesters howl from the right. But if Roper portends the loss of Roe, the
left will rue this day.48  If there is a constant law in constitutional
comparativism, it may be the law of unintended consequences.
One may quibble with the placement of one or more cases based on
one's expert knowledge of a particular comparative experience. A detailed
survey of the comparative plane for all fundamental rights does not exist, and
I present these preliminary conclusions as good faith simplifications. But this
effort to place our jurisprudence in international context underscores the
degree to which the Roper paradigm might open for reconsideration
constitutional rights based on their disequilibrium' with international values.
145. 307 U.S. 174 (1939) (right to bear arms).
146. 535 U.S. 564 (2002) (online pornography as protected speech).
147. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (gay marriage).
148. One could almost see the pain on Justice Ginsburg's face when, with great hesitation,
she admitted at the ASIL annual meeting on April 1, 2005 that we should look "abroad for nega-
tive examples" on questions such as abortion. See supra note 111.
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Of course, one doubts that the Court will (indeed hopes the Court will
not) seriously undertake this project.'49 There are principled reasons why robust
comparativism is suspect. As I have indicated elsewhere, constitutional
comparativism is simply a type of "values comparativism" in which
international experiences "offer delocalized, independent moral and political
arguments that serve as an index of the correctness of competing claims about
essentially contestable concepts embodied in aspirational provisions of the
Constitution."' 50  As such, these comparative values will be relegated under
most constitutional theories to a status at the bottom of the hierarchy of the
interpretive canon: below text, structure, history, and national experience." '
But when these interpretive sources are equivocal (as they often will be with
contested claims regarding aspirational rights), it would appear the Court in
Roper is suggesting that international equipoise may be invoked to confirm the
Court's independent judgment of what the Constitution requires.
It may be that the Court is embarking on the dangerous path'52 of a
constitutional theory that, at least on discrete matters, is truly comparative, with
international values used as a benchmark of what our Constitution requires.
While the Court is confident that comparative references do not lessen
fidelity to the Constitution, it is by no means certain that other Americans
share this confidence. 53 This is no trifling matter, for "a crucial aim of
constitutional theorizing is to identify interpretive principles that others can
reasonably be asked to accept."'54 If the Court is introducing a jurisprudence
149. Significantly, in the recent case of Kelo, the Supreme Court made no reference to
international or comparative law in determining what constituted "public use" under the Fifth
Amendment. See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). This is despite clear
international law principles on the subject, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 712 n.4 (1987), and an amicus brief that addressed
the relevance of international law in understanding the Fifth Amendment. See Brief of Amicus
Curiae The Claremont Institute Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence in Support of Petitioners
9-10, 22, Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005) (No. 04-108).
150. Alford, supra note 76, at 63-64.
151. Id. at 64.
152. I say "dangerous" for the reasons outlined in my previous article addressing a comparative
theory. Such a theory is problematic from the perspective of upholding the rule of law, promoting political
democracy, and respecting a morally defensible set of individual rights. See Alford, supra note 1, at 709-12.
153. For example, confidence in the Court among certain congressional leaders has waned in
the wake of Roper, with some going so far as to call for retaliation against and impeachment of Justice
Kennedy. See, e.g., Dana Milbank, And the Verdict on Justice Kennedy Is: Guilty, WASH. POST, Apr.
9, 2005, at A3; Dahlia Lithwick, Needles and Threats: More Tough Talk About Pulverizing the Judiciary
State, SLATE, Apr. 5, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2116256. This in turn led to a remarkable letter
sent to all members of Congress by 140 law school deans urging them to stop the "irresponsible" and
"harmful" statements implying "that judges may be impeached or otherwise punished because of their
rulings." Statement by Law School Deans, at http://www.nyu.edu/public.affairs/releases/detail/647
(last visited Sept. 12, 2005).
154. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CAL L REV. 535, 572 (1999).
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of international equipoise, then we are on a constitutional journey to
destinations we can scarcely imagine. One wonders if the Court has calculated
the difficulty of attaining broad acceptance from others to journey along this
unfamiliar road.55 Undoubtedly many Americans will be quite reluctant to
take the path of comparative constitutionalism, sharing the recent skepticism
of Justice O'Connor: "Those who would renegotiate the bounda-
ries ... must... answer a difficult question: Why would we trade a system that
has served us so well for one that has served others so poorly?"'56
155. As Richard Fallon has stated:
[Tihe project of implementing the Constitution... is inherently a shared one, which
requires coordinated action based on mutually acceptable premises. All else being equal,
one theory should therefore be preferred to another if it is more consonant with widely
shared values or has better prospects of attaining broad acceptance.
Id. at 577-78; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr. Foreword: Implementing the Constiuion, 111 HARV. L REV. 56
(1997). Fallon also asserts:
[A] Justice's job is not just to reach a personal judgment about how the Constitution,
viewed in light of correct moral principles, would best be read.... The Justices' role is also,
at least as importantly, one of taking into account and sometimes accommodating the
reasonable views of others. The Justices' role, moreover, is not exclusively one of truth-
telling about the meaning of the Constitution... but is also one, sometimes predominantly, of
participating in a necessarily cooperative project of implementing the Constitution.... The
Justices would be unfaithful to their roles if, trying to do too much too fast with inadequate
resources, they prematurely spoke the truth as they personally saw it and crafted bad
doctrine that frustrated reasoned debate and democratic experiment.
Id. at 147-48.
156. McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2746 (2005) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see
also id. at 2748 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (contrasting European and American approaches to church-
state relations).

